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INTRODUCTION 
 Mounting evidence demonstrates that retail investors make predictable, 
costly mistakes.1 They save too little, they trade too frequently, they buy 
high and sell low, they invest in fad instruments they do not understand, 
and they pay excessive fees. In an August 2012, 200-page study prepared in 
response to a Dodd–Frank2 mandate, the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) concluded that “American investors lack basic financial literacy.”3 
The study found that investors do not understand basic concepts such as 
diversification, investment costs, inflation, and compound interest, and that 
they lack the knowledge necessary to protect themselves from fraud.4  
Despite investors’ seemingly limited competence, regulatory and market 
developments increasingly require retail investors to navigate the financial 
markets themselves. Over the past thirty-five years, participant-directed 
401(k) plans have largely replaced professionally managed pension plans.5 
Unlike traditional pension plans, participant-directed 401(k) plans place the 
responsibility for critical investment decisions in the hands of employees, 
who select their own investments from a menu of employer-provided 
alternatives. This means that low-level employees—individuals with even 
 
1 See, e.g., Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the 
Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 319 (2008) (concluding that “individual 
investors have a striking ability to do the wrong thing”).  
2 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
3 OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, STAFF STUDY REGARDING  
FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 15 (2012) [hereinafter SEC STAFF STUDY], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf. 
4 Id. 
5 See Pamela Perun & Joseph John Valenti, Defined Benefit Plans: Going, Going, Gone? 4 & fig.1 
(2008), available at http://planetnow.com/metaPage/lib/Perun-ValentiFinalAppam.pdf (“In 1975, 
over 70% of active employees participated in a defined benefit plan. In 2005, the majority of active 
employees (over 75%) participated in a defined contribution plan instead.”). 
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less investment knowledge than the general population6—are now investing 
for retirement with almost no guidance. 
To complicate matters further, mutual funds are the dominant invest-
ment option provided by employer-sponsored 401(k) plans and the primary 
way in which retail investors participate in the stock market, both in and 
outside of retirement plans.7 Unlike other equity investments, notably stock, 
mutual funds are held primarily by individual investors.8 This market 
segmentation means that retail fund investors cannot benefit from the 
market discipline exercised by more sophisticated institutions.9  
As a result, there are reasons to doubt the efficiency of the mutual fund 
market and to ask whether the market offers retail investors reasonable and 
comprehensible investment options. In particular, many commentators are 
puzzled by the large number of fund choices and by the persistence of high-
fee funds that underperform the market.10  
Congress, the SEC, the Department of Labor, and the courts have 
struggled with the possibility that market forces are insufficient to protect 
retail investors from making poor investment decisions. Regulatory re-
sponses designed to protect investors include mandated disclosure require-
ments, product limits, and the imposition of fiduciary duties on employers, 
brokers, and investment advisers. Widespread litigation over the role of 
judicial oversight of mutual fund fees and the scope of employer obligations 
in designing retirement plans raises questions about the manner in which 
individuals make investment decisions. In one such high profile case, 
Seventh Circuit Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, although 
 
6 Cf. SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 3, at 15 (“In particular, surveys demonstrate that certain 
subgroups, including women, African-Americans, Hispanics, the oldest segment of the elderly 
population, and those who are poorly educated, have an even greater [lack] of investment 
knowledge than the average general population.”). 
7 See INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 95 (53d ed. 2013) [here-
inafter ICI FACT BOOK], available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf (stating 
that, in 2012, seventy-two percent of mutual fund–holding households owned mutual fund shares 
inside retirement plans). 
8 See id. at 90 (explaining that households owned eighty-nine percent of total mutual fund 
assets as of the end of 2012). Institutional use of mutual funds is limited and consists mostly of 
money market funds, which are used for cash management. See id. at 105-06. 
9 Some mutual funds operate multiple versions that are sold to retail and institutional inves-
tors. Although institutional “twins” typically charge lower fees than retail funds, one study found 
that retail funds with an institutional twin perform better, which suggests that, in this context, 
retail investors can benefit from the market discipline imposed by institutions. See generally 
Richard B. Evans & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: 
Evidence from Retail–Institutional Fund Twins, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 3530 (2012). 
10 See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BET-
TER WAY TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 8-9 (2007) (observing that the mutual fund industry 
“does not appear to conform to the ‘law of one price’”). 
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reaching opposite conclusions about investor behavior, each suggested that 
the manner in which such decisions are made is critical to evaluating the 
appropriate level of regulatory intervention.11 
The importance of understanding investor behavior is not limited to the 
litigation context. With employees’ increasing dependence on their 401(k) 
plans to deliver retirement income, employers are rethinking issues such as 
plan structure and the choice of investment options.12 BrightScope’s highly 
publicized online ratings and rankings of 401(k) plans have heightened 
employer attention to the importance of plan design.13  
Congress has recently acknowledged the need for a better understanding 
of investor behavior. In the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress instructed the SEC 
to conduct a study of investor financial literacy.14 The SEC’s study was 
conducted at the most superficial level, however, and provided limited 
insight into developing future regulatory policy.15 Although the SEC found 
investor mistakes and misconceptions, it did not seek to identify the reasons 
for these mistakes or to understand the underlying mechanisms driving 
investor choices.16  
This Article takes up where the SEC study left off. We report the results 
of an experiment designed to explore how investors use the information 
provided to them, and why they often ignore it. Using a simulated investment 
game in which participants were asked to allocate funds in a retirement 
account among ten mutual fund alternatives, we offer some insights into 
 
11 Compare Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(reasoning that market discipline should constrain excessive mutual fund fees by driving investors 
away from costly funds), with Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Posner, J., dissenting) (questioning whether high fees actually drive investors away), denying reh’g 
en banc to 527 F.3d 627. The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit decision without 
resolving the question. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430-31 (2010) (“The 
debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding 
today’s mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”). 
12 See, e.g., AON HEWITT, 2011 TRENDS & EXPERIENCE IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLANS: PAVING THE ROAD TO RETIREMENT (2011), available at http://www.aon.com/ 
attachments/thought-leadership/2011_Trends_Experience_Executive_Summary_v5.pdf (explain-
ing emerging trends in plan design and administration). 
13 See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Spotlighting 401(k) Plans, Thanklessly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, at B1 
(describing attention received by BrightScope ratings and criticisms of its methodology); 
Christine P. Roberts, Your 401(k) Plan’s Online Report Card—and What to Do About It, E IS FOR 
ERISA (Oct. 5, 2011, 7:49 PM), http://eforerisa.wordpress.com/2011/10/05/your-401k-plans-online-
report-card-and-what-to-do-about-it (providing advice to employers on addressing a low Bright-
Scope rating). 
14 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 917, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1836 (2010).  
15 See generally SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 3. 
16 See id. at iii-vii. 
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how individuals seek and assimilate information about a fund’s characteris-
tics. In particular, our experiment offers a novel addition to the body of 
experimental evidence on investor decisionmaking by incorporating a 
technology that allows us to collect data on the specific information that 
investors choose to view.  
In addition to collecting general information about the process by which 
investors choose among mutual fund options, we employ an experimental 
manipulation to test the effect of an instruction on the importance of 
mutual fund fees. Pairing this instruction with simplified fee disclosure 
allows us to distinguish between motivation limits and cognition limits as 
explanations for the widespread findings that investors ignore fees in their 
investment decisions.  
Our results offer partial, limited grounds for optimism. On the one 
hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects allocated 
more money, on average, to higher-value funds. Furthermore, subjects who 
received the Fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual fund fees and 
allocated their investments into funds with lower fees. On the other hand, 
the effects of even a blunt fee instruction were limited, and investors were 
unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund options. In addition, our 
results suggest that excessive and naïve diversification strategies are driving 
many investment decisions.  
Our findings are concededly preliminary. More important, because of 
the simplified nature of our experiment, our results may not fully explain 
real-world investment decisions, in which the stakes and the cost of gather-
ing and evaluating investment information are much higher. Nonetheless, 
our research offers a starting point in terms of both understanding investor 
behavior and evaluating efforts to improve the quality of investor decisions. 
In particular, determining whether effective investor education is possible is 
critical to evaluating the manner in which we regulate, structure, and 
evaluate retail investing options such as retirement plans.  
The Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly describes the regulatory 
environment for mutual funds and 401(k) retirement plans. Part II identifies 
key findings on retail investor decisionmaking and observes how these 
findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of market discipline in the mutual 
fund market. Part III describes our experiment structure. Part IV reports 
our results. Part V explores the implications of our findings and identifies 
next steps for additional research.  
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I. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR  
MUTUAL FUNDS AND 401(k) PLANS 
A. Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are the dominant investment vehicle for retail investors.17 
A mutual fund is a pool of assets that may include stocks, bonds, and other 
investment products. A mutual fund investor purchases shares that repre-
sent a pro rata ownership interest in the fund’s pool of assets. The fund is 
required to value its assets on a daily basis and to purchase and sell fund 
shares at their net asset value (NAV).18  
At the end of 2012, there were over 7596 mutual funds in the United 
States.19 Mutual funds are typically categorized according to the types of 
assets in which they invest. These include funds that invest primarily in 
equity, funds confined to fixed income investments, and hybrid funds that 
combine the two. Funds may be actively managed or seek to replicate the 
performance of an index, such as the S&P 500. Some funds focus on a 
particular segment of the market, like energy stocks or pharmaceuticals; 
others invest in specific asset classes, like large cap equities or junk bonds. 
International funds purchase assets from across the globe or within a 
specific foreign country or geographic region. Target date funds offer a 
shifting mix of equities and fixed income assets that becomes more con-
servative as the specified target date approaches.20  
Mutual funds do not typically hire employees to make investment deci-
sions or perform administrative services.21 Instead, funds outsource all 
operational requirements to outside service providers. The funds pass on 
the costs of these services to the funds’ shareholders in the form of various 
fees. Funds’ fees can include sales fees (also known as “loads”), management 
 
17 See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 90 (noting that “53.8 million households, or 44 per-
cent of all U.S. households, owned mutual funds” in 2012). The global economic importance of 
mutual funds is even greater. The Investment Company Institute reported 73,243 mutual funds 
worldwide, holding almost $27 trillion in assets at the end of 2012. Id. at 201 tbl.61, 202 tbl.62. 
18 For a general description of mutual funds, see Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of 
Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967-75 (2010). 
19 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 142 tbl.1. In addition to funds, there were over 1194 ex-
change-traded funds (ETF) as of the end of 2012. Id. at 155 tbl.14. ETFs differ from mutual funds 
on several key features—including the manner in which they trade—but offer investors a similar 
type of diversified investment. See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1978-82. 
20 Target date funds are often used for retirement investing. See Fisch, supra note 18, at 2022-24. 
21 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (“The typical mutual fund is a 
rudimentary legal vessel into which shareholders contribute money and over which a board of 
trustees governs; the fund has no offices, no equipment, and no employees.”). 
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fees, distribution (12b-1) fees, and administrative expenses.22 Of these fees, 
the largest are management fees, which are paid to the funds’ investment 
advisers. In addition to these fees, a fund may have less transparent expenses, 
such as trading commissions. The cost of commissions is not included in the 
funds’ tables of fees, but is also borne by the funds’ shareholders.23 The 
complexity of fund fee structures makes it difficult to calculate costs or 
compare different funds.24  
As of 2012, forty-four percent of U.S. households, or 53.8 million house-
holds, owned mutual funds.25 Mutual fund investing is not limited to 
wealthy or sophisticated retail investors; to the contrary, in 2012, most 
mutual fund–owning households had incomes of less than $100,000.26 The 
relative lack of sophistication among mutual fund investors has led Con-
gress and the SEC to regulate mutual funds strictly.  
The SEC oversees the operation of mutual funds, which are regulated 
by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA).27 Among the regulations 
imposed on mutual funds are extensive disclosure requirements, including 
disclosure of a fund’s investment objectives, costs, investment strategies, and 
advisers.28 Funds are restricted in their investments, in their use of leverage, 
and in the manner in which they compensate their investment advisers.29 
The ICA also requires mutual funds to have a board of directors, at least 
forty percent of whom must be independent of the fund’s investment 
 
22 OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR 
INVESTORS 12-15 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov./investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-
funds.pdf. 
23 Fisch, supra note 18 at 1996-98. 
24 As one commentator has observed, the complexity of fee structures may allow mutual 
funds to resist competitive pressure by preventing retail investors from understanding fund 
pricing. Bruce I. Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 278, 
283 (2009). 
25 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 90. Mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over 
the past thirty years. In 1980, less than six percent of U.S. households owned mutual funds. Id. 
26 Id. at 94. Only thirty-nine percent of mutual fund–owning households had incomes over 
$100,000, and the median income for mutual fund–holding households was $80,000. Id. 
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
28 Fisch, supra note 18, at 1968-69. 
29 Id. at 1970-72. 
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adviser.30 Finally, the ICA requires a fund’s shareholders to elect the 
directors and to approve certain structural changes.31 
The extensive regulation of mutual funds is a direct response to con-
cerns about investor exploitation and the inability of market forces to 
protect investors adequately. According to SEC estimates, investors in 
mutual funds lost forty percent of their investments between 1929 and 
1936.32 Congress found, relying on an SEC study, that mutual fund sponsors 
were acting largely out of self-interest, abandoning their fiduciary duties to 
investors and charging investors with unjustified costs and expenses.33 The 
ICA was Congress’s response to that problem.34 
Nevertheless, the problem of mutual funds charging excessive fees con-
tinued. In 1966, the SEC reported to Congress that neither the ICA nor 
market discipline provided mutual fund investors with sufficient protection 
against excessive costs.35 The SEC noted that the problem was exacerbated 
by the fact that mutual funds were sold primarily to “family m[e]n of 
moderate income.”36 In response, the SEC recommended that the ICA be 
amended to limit investment advisers to a “reasonable” fee for their man-
agement services and “that this standard be enforceable in the courts.”37  
Congress adopted the SEC’s recommendation and included § 36(b) in 
the 1970 revisions to the ICA. Section 36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty upon 
investment advisers with respect to compensation received from a mutual 
fund and provides investors with a private right of action to enforce this 
 
30 Id. at 1967. SEC rules set a higher threshold, requiring fund boards to have a majority of 
independent directors in order for the fund to qualify for certain exemptive rules. See Role of 
Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7932, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3736 ( Jan. 
16, 2001) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.). 
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13 & -16. Unlike operating companies, mutual funds need not provide 
annual meetings for the election of directors. 
32 Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Opening Remarks at a Celebration of the 60th 
Anniversary of the Investment Company Act (Oct. 4, 2000), available at www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch405.htm. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, 
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at viii (2d Sess. 1966) (“[M]utual fund shareholders need protection 
against incurring excessive costs in the acquisition and management of their investments 
and . . . , given the structure and incentives prevailing in the industry, neither competition nor 
the few elementary safeguards against conflict of interest deemed sufficient in 1940 and contained 
in the [ICA] presently provide this protection in adequate measure.”). 
36 Id. at ix. 
37 Id. at viii. 
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duty.38 Today, fees are far lower than they were in the 1960s, and, according 
to the Investment Company Institute, most new investments are made in 
funds that charge lower fees.39 Nonetheless, mutual fund fees continue to 
vary significantly. The New York Times reports, based on data from the 
Investment Company Institute, that the average expense ratio for equity 
mutual funds is 1.44%,40 but fees range from 0.05%41 to more than 2%.42  
Although one might imagine that competitive markets would make it 
difficult for investors to raise legal challenges to fees they voluntarily 
elected to pay, suits against mutual fund advisers alleging excessive fees are 
surprisingly common.43 To date, no court has held an adviser liable in so-
called “§ 36(b)” litigation,44 but one commentator estimates that the defense 
and settlement of these lawsuits cost the mutual fund industry about $400 
million per year.45 To a certain extent, this litigation pits the legal standard 
of fiduciary obligation against the effectiveness of market discipline. 
This tension was recently exposed in the Seventh Circuit opinions in 
Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.46 The panel majority in Jones viewed extensive 
judicial oversight of fee levels as inappropriate, reasoning that “investors 
can and do protect their interests by shopping, and that regulating advisory 
fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good than harm.”47 Critical to 
the court’s analysis was an assessment of the role of investor decisions in 
constraining fees. As Judge Posner observed in his dissent from the denial of 
 
38 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, § 20, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 
1428-30 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2012)); see also Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010). 
39 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 75-76. 
40 Anna Bernasek, What a Difference a Percentage Point Can Make, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, at BU18. 
41 See, e.g., Vanguard 500 Index Fund Admiral Shares, VANGUARD, https://personal.vanguard.com/ 
us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0540&FundIntExt=INT (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (reporting the exp-
ense ratio as of April 12, 2013, for those investing a minimum of $10,000). 
42 See, e.g., AllianceBernstein Blended Style Funds Tax-Managed International Portfolio, ALLI-
ANCE BERNSTEIN, https://www.alliancebernstein.com/abcom/Product_Center/3_Vehicle/MF/ 
Equity/Core/Tax-Mgd_International_Portfolio.htm?+=performance (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) 
(click “Performance” tab) (reporting net and gross expense ratios of 2.40% as of January 31, 2013). 
43 See M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010) (finding 
that more than 100 lawsuits have been filed since 1970, when the ICA was amended to provide a 
private right of action under § 36(b)); Quinn Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual 
Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: Do the Merits Matter?, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1852652 (reporting, from 2000 to 2009, 
ninety-one investor suits against mutual fund advisers alleging excessive fees). 
44 Henderson, supra note 43, at 1033. 
45 Id. at 1043. 
46 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir.), reh’g denied, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and vacated and 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). 
47 Id. at 634. 
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the petition for rehearing en banc, the court’s reasoning raised an important 
empirical question: “[W]ill high fees drive investors away?”48  
The Supreme Court in Jones did not resolve what one commentator 
terms “the sharp disagreement between two leading market-oriented jurists” 
about the operation of the market for mutual funds.49 Empirical studies 
have begun to try to answer this question, and the study we report in Part 
III adds to that growing literature. 
B. 401(k) Plans 
Courts and policymakers are increasingly concerned with mutual fund 
investment decisionmaking, because mutual funds are the primary vehicle 
for employee retirement savings. Over the past forty years, employee 
retirement savings plans50 have largely shifted from defined benefit pension 
plans51 to defined contribution plans52—primarily 401(k) plans.53 This shift 
has transferred responsibility for investment decisions from the employer to 
individual employees. Although the employees direct the investment of 
their retirement funds in a 401(k) plan, the employer selects the menu of 
investment options available, thus limiting the employees’ allocations to the 
choices provided.54 
 So-called “participant control” allows the employer to reduce its liability 
exposure. Specifically, § 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Sec-
urity Act of 1974 (ERISA) exempts fiduciaries from liability for losses 
caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their individual 
 
48 537 F.3d at 731 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
49 Larry E. Ribstein, Federal Misgovernance of Mutual Funds, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 301, 316. The Supreme Court did not attempt to resolve this question. See Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 
1430-31 (“The debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of 
rehearing regarding today’s mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”). 
50 Employee retirement plans are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
51 Defined benefit plans, the category encompassing most traditional pension plans, “generally 
promise[] the participant a fixed level of retirement income, which is typically based on the 
employee’s years of service and compensation.” LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 
248, 250 n.1 (2008). 
52 Defined contribution plans “promise[] the participant the value of an individual account at 
retirement, which is largely a function of the amounts contributed to that account and the 
investment performance of those contributions.” Id. 
53 See id. at 255 (“Defined contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene today.”); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004) (“[I]n the 
years before ERISA, the traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant device for retirement 
savings.”). 
54 For an analysis of the effect of providing a menu of alternatives as well as the importance 
of the menu choices provided, see Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006). 
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accounts.55 As of February 2012, the Department of Labor estimated that 72 
million individuals are covered by 401(k) plans in which individual partici-
pants are responsible for directing the investment of their retirement 
savings.56 
ERISA does not restrict the types of investments that an employer may 
offer through a 401(k) plan. The options commonly include mutual funds, 
money market funds, real estate accounts, stable value funds, and company 
stock.57 In order to obtain the benefit of ERISA’s § 404(c) safe harbor, a 
plan must offer investors at least three “diversified” investment options with 
“materially different risk and return characteristics.”58 Most 401(k) plans 
offer employees substantially more options. According to BrightScope, in 
2011, the average 401(k) plan offered employees twenty-four investment 
options.59 Some plans offer hundreds or even thousands of choices.60 
Approximately half of all 401(k) plan assets are invested in mutual funds.61 
 Employers usually delegate the administration of their 401(k) plans to 
an independent service provider, which may be a bank, an investment 
company, or an insurance company.62 The service provider acts as a trustee 
for the plan, bundles various administrative functions for the employer, and 
helps the employer select the investment options. One study reports that 
mutual fund families act as trustees for seventy-seven percent of plans.63 
Although many service providers include funds from outside the trustee’s 
family, affiliated funds tend to dominate the product lines of mutual fund 
trustees. Commentators have identified the selection of the trustee’s own 
product line as a potential conflict of interest and have also found that 
 
55 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2012). 
56 EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: FINAL RULE 
TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE 
RETIREMENT PLANS (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsparticipantfeerule.pdf. 
57 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-291, 401(K) PLANS: CERTAIN IN-
VESTMENT OPTIONS AND PRACTICES THAT MAY RESTRICT WITHDRAWALS NOT WIDELY 
UNDERSTOOD 8-9 & tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 GAO REPORT], available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/assets/320/316437.pdf. 
58 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B). 
59 Jack Hough, Getting the Most from a Lame 401(k) Retirement Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8-9, 
2011, at B7. 
60 See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing Deere & 
Co.’s plan as offering more than 2500 investment options). 
61 Sarah Holden & David Abbey, Fortune’s Assessment of Industry Stance on 401(k) Fees Is Mis-
guided, ICI VIEWPOINTS ( June 25, 2012), http://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_12_fortune_ 
401k_fees.  
62 2011 GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 6. 
63 Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual 
Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans 9 ( Jan. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2112263. 
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trustees may be less inclined to remove one of their own underperforming 
funds from the plan menu.64  
Service providers charge various types of fees to 401(k) plan sponsors in 
connection with the provision of administrative services.65 Both the amount 
and type of fee can vary dramatically among providers.66 A substantial 
percentage of plans pass through all or part of fees charged by their service 
providers to plan participants.67 In addition to the plan-level fees, partici-
pants pay expenses and fees associated with different investment options 
offered by the plan, such as mutual fund expenses and transaction fees. 
ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations on the sponsor in connection with 
the selection of investment options,68 and sponsor contracts with service 
providers typically give the sponsor authority for the selection of invest-
ment options in the plan.69 As a fiduciary, the sponsor is required to select 
and periodically evaluate the plan’s mix and range of investment options.70 
In determining whether the sponsor has adhered to its obligations, courts 
have considered “the range of investment options and the characteristics of 
those included options—including the risk profiles, investment strategies, 
and associated fees.”71  
Commentators have debated what these fiduciary obligations mean, spe-
cifically the extent to which they may require sponsors to choose the lowest-
cost mutual fund options.72 Commentators have also debated the extent to 
 
64 Id. at 1-2, 5, 29-30. 
65 In response to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study finding that many 
plan sponsors did not know or understand the fees charged by their plans, the Department of 
Labor adopted new regulations, effective in July 2012, requiring detailed fee disclosure from 
service providers to plan sponsors. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1) (2012); see also GAO, GAO-12-
325, 401(K) PLANS: INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT 
MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN FEES 24-28, 44, 48 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 GAO REPORT], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590359.pdf (describing employers’ limited awareness 
and understanding of plan fees); Mary Beth Franklin, New Fee Disclosure Rules Could Shake Up 
401(k) World, INVESTMENTNEWS ( June 24, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20120624/REG/306249994 (describing new disclosure requirements and predicting their effect). 
The regulations also required that service providers disclose fee information to plan participants. 
29 CFR § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iv)–(vi). 
66 See 2012 GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 7-10.  
67 See id. at 16-18, 21. 
68 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006) (assigning sponsors the fiduciary duty to, inter alia, “di-
versify[] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses”). 
69 See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, under its 
contract with the defendant, service provider Fidelity had “no contractual authority to control the 
mix and range of investment opinions”). 
70 Id. at 326. 
71 Id. at 327. 
72 See Christopher Carosa, 401k Plan Sponsors and the Mutual Fund Expense Ratio Wild Goose 
Chase, FIDUCIARY NEWS ( July 3, 2012), http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2012/07/401k-plan-
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which sponsors effectively minimize investment costs. Although some argue 
that retirement plan fees are unduly expensive and that, in particular, the 
mutual fund options offered by 401(k) plans are more costly and less 
attractive than available alternatives,73 others dispute those claims.74 
With the formation of BrightScope in 2009, employers have faced in-
creasing public scrutiny of their 401(k) plans.75 Using a proprietary formula, 
BrightScope collects and analyzes publicly available data about thousands of 
employer-sponsored 401(k) plans and publishes the results through a series 
of online ratings and rankings.76 Although BrightScope claims to include 
over 200 separate inputs in its analysis, its methodology focuses primarily 
on the speed with which a plan participant can accumulate sufficient savings 
to retire.77 This approach has been criticized as skewing BrightScope’s 
ratings results in favor of issuers that have highly compensated employees 
or generous employer-matching provisions.78 BrightScope does, however, 
analyze investment menu quality.79 The BrightScope ratings have generated 
substantial publicity and have caused many employers to rethink the 
structure of their plans.80 
 
sponsors-and-the-mutual-fund-expense-ratio-wild-goose-chase (“The [Department of Labor] has 
been careful to warn plan sponsors not to merely go to the lowest cost provider.”). 
73 See, e.g., Scott Cendrowski, The 401(k) Fee Revolution, FORTUNE, July 2, 2012, at 66 (argu-
ing that many 401(k) plans are not competitively priced). 
74 See, e.g., Holden & Abbey, supra note 61 (arguing that 401(k) fees pay for services that are 
valuable to participants). 
75 See Lieber, supra note 13, at B1, B5 (describing BrightScope’s formation and its retirement 
plan rating services). 
76 Id. 
77 See Frequently Asked Questions, Data and Methodology: What Is a BrightScope Rating?, 
BRIGHTSCOPE, http://www.brightscope.com/faq/401k-retirement/#WhatRating (last visited Jan. 
24, 2014). 
78 See, e.g., Amy Feldman, How Good Is Your 401(k)?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 
30, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_02/b4162060137562.htm (“Bright-
Scope’s list of top 401(k) plans is dominated by industries . . . where the workforce is well-paid 
and stable.”); Steve Utkus, Rating Your 401(k), VANGUARD BLOG (March 15, 2010), 
http://www.vanguardblog.com/2010/03/15/rating-your-401k (noting that higher-paid workers save 
more and that ratings cannot account for discrepancies in participants’ incomes). 
79 Press Release, BrightScope, BrightScope Announces the Top 25 San Francisco Area-Based 
Companies with the Best 401k Plans (Sept. 17, 2013), available at https://bscp.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
uploads/press_piece_pdfs/2013826_SF_Top_Plans_AtomicFINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
At least one academic study has highlighted major deficiencies in plan-level investment menus. See 
Quinn Curtis & Ian Ayres, Measuring Fiduciary and Investor Losses in 401(k) Plans (2013) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Curtis 
Ayres_401kFees%281%29.pdf. 
80 See Michelle Rafter, BrightScope Shines a Light on 401(k) Plans, WORKFORCE (March 10, 
2010), http://www.workforce.com/articles/brightscope-shines-a-light-on-401-k-plans (reporting 
that employers are “making adjustments to their retirement plans because of BrightScope”). 
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Courts faced with legal challenges to 401(k) plans have largely focused 
on whether employers have offered a sufficient number of different invest-
ment options, rather than examining the quality of those options or the 
choice architecture. In a number of recent cases, employees have sued their 
employers, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty based on the employer’s 
failure to select appropriate investment options and, in particular, to offer 
mutual fund options with sufficiently low costs.81 In many of these cases, 
courts have concluded that the employer has fulfilled its fiduciary obliga-
tions merely by offering its employees a sufficient range of investment 
options. Market competition and investor choice, the cases suggest, provide 
employees with adequate protection.  
In Hecker v. Deere & Co., for example, the plan offered employees “a 
generous choice of investment options” that included “23 different Fidelity 
mutual funds, two investment funds managed by Fidelity Trust, a fund 
devoted to Deere’s stock, and a Fidelity-operated facility called Brokerage-
Link, which gave participants access to some 2,500 additional funds man-
aged by different companies.”82 All the funds “were available on the open 
market for the same fee.”83 As the court explained, “[T]he undisputed facts 
[left] no room for doubt that the Deere Plans offered a sufficient mix of 
investments for their participants. . . . Importantly, all of these funds were 
also offered to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios 
necessarily were set against the backdrop of market competition.”84 Similarly, 
in Renfro v. Unisys Corp., the Third Circuit concluded that an employer met 
its fiduciary obligations by providing an adequate range and mix of invest-
ment options—in the case of Unisys, the plan offered “seventy-three 
distinct investment options.”85  
In contrast, the court in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. refused to dis-
miss similar allegations concerning Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan.86 Braden 
claimed that Wal-Mart included funds with unreasonably high fees in its 
401(k) plan, allegedly due in part to fee-sharing between the funds and 
 
81 The basis for this litigation stems from the Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue v. DeWolff, 
Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 250, 256 (2008), where the Court stated that “a participant in a 
defined contribution pension plan [may] sue a fiduciary whose alleged misconduct impaired the 
value of plan assets in the participant’s individual account.” 
82 556 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2009). 
83 Id. at 579. 
84 Id. at 586. 
85 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2011). 
86 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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Merrill Lynch, the plan’s trustee.87 Braden argued that this resulted in the 
plan paying $20 million per year in excessive fees.88 
The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff ’s complaint adequately al-
leged that Wal-Mart breached its fiduciary duty in selecting investment 
options for the company’s 401(k) plan: 
Taken as true, and considered as a whole, the complaint’s allegations can be 
understood to assert that the Plan include[d] a relatively limited menu of 
funds which were selected by Wal-Mart executives despite the ready availa-
bility of better options. The complaint allege[d], moreover, that these op-
tions were chosen to benefit the trustee at the expense of the participants.89  
The court noted, in particular, that the Wal-Mart plan offered a limited 
number of options, consisting of “ten mutual funds, a common/collective 
trust, Wal-Mart common stock, and a stable value fund.”90 Comparing Wal-
Mart’s plan to Deere & Co.’s plan, which offered its participants access to 
more than 2500 mutual funds, the court stated that the “far narrower range 
of investment options available in this case makes more plausible the claim 
that this Plan was imprudently managed.”91  
These 401(k) fiduciary duty cases are premised on two critical assump-
tions. First, they assume that market forces adequately protect mutual fund 
investors from excessive fees. Second, they reflect the courts’ perception 
that employers best serve their employees’ interests by offering a large 
menu of investment options. As the next Section suggests, research has cast 
doubt upon the accuracy of both of these assumptions. In particular, 
employers can easily sabotage their employees’ investment decisions by 
offering plan choices that are too expensive, too complex, or simply too 
numerous.92 
 
87 Id. at 590. Following the court’s decision, Wal-Mart and Merrill Lynch agreed to a $13.5 
million settlement of the litigation. See William P. Barrett, Walmart, Merrill Lynch Agree to Pay 
$13.5 Million to Settle 401(k) Fiduciary Lawsuit, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/williampbarrett/2011/12/05/walmart-merrill-lynch-agree-to-pay-13-5-million-to-settle-401k-
fiduciary-lawsuit. 
88 Wal-Mart, 588 F.3d at 590. 
89 Id. at 596 (citation omitted). 
90 Id. at 589. 
91 Id. at 596 n.6. 
92 See, e.g., Charles D. Ellis, Murder on the Orient Express: The Mystery of Underperformance, 68 
FIN. ANALYSTS J., July–Aug. 2012, at 13, 13 (criticizing employers for investing in higher-cost 
actively managed funds in a futile search for outperformance). 
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II. THE LITERATURE ON INVESTOR DECISIONMAKING 
Understanding consumer investment behavior is critical, because the 
regulatory structure described above is based in part on assumptions about 
how individuals make investment decisions. Empirical studies demonstrate 
a wide variety of investor mistakes ranging from saving too little to trading 
too frequently.93 Investors lack basic financial literacy, including the ability 
to understand the effect of compound interest or to construct a diversified 
portfolio. Our study focuses on a widely reported investor mistake: the 
willingness to invest in high-fee funds despite evidence that such funds 
consistently underperform the market. The persistence of this behavior 
weighs against the claim that competition in the market for mutual funds 
can keep fees low without regulatory oversight. 
A. Cost-Sensitive Investing 
Studies strongly suggest that, of the information available to retail in-
vestors, fund expenses are the best predictor of future returns and that 
lower expenses are correlated with higher returns.94 Morningstar’s Director 
of Mutual Fund Research has observed, “If there’s anything in the whole 
world of mutual funds that you can take to the bank, it’s that expense ratios 
help you make a better decision.”95 In one recent study, Michael Cooper, 
Michael Halling, and Michael Lemmon found that, among the funds in 
their sample, lower-fee funds outperformed otherwise observably identical 
higher-fee funds by thirty-two percent.96 
The literature in this area is extensive, and the results of some studies 
conflict.97 Nonetheless, most studies find that high-fee funds underperform 
 
93 See generally FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BEHAVIORAL PAT-
TERNS AND PITFALLS OF U.S. INVESTORS (2010) (summarizing economic studies of investor 
mistakes). 
94 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1993 (summarizing studies showing that “the most consistent 
predictor of a fund’s return to investors is the fund’s expense ratio”). 
95 Russel Kinnel, How Expense Ratios and Star Ratings Predict Success, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 
9, 2010), http://news.morningstar.com/ARTICLENET/ARTICLE.ASPX?id=347327. Morningstar 
compared the predictive power of its star ratings—which take into account expenses as well as 
other variables—to expense ratios alone, and found that the expense ratio alone was a better 
predictor of future fund performance than the star ratings in a majority of the years analyzed. Id. 
96 Michael Cooper, Michael Halling & Michael Lemmon, Violations of the Law of One Fee 
in the Mutual Fund Industry 14-15 (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456079.  
97 See Martijn Cremers et al., The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide: Explicit and Closet 
Indexing, Fees, and Performance 1 (Sept. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830207 
(surveying the conflicting literature regarding the relative value of passive versus active manage-
ment of equity funds). 
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both their lower-fee competitors98 and passively managed index funds that 
provide a market rate of return.99 Although there is evidence that some 
managers have superior stock-picking ability that persists over time,100 many 
studies find that managers are not able to beat the market over the long 
run.101 Even if some funds consistently outperform the market, the percentage 
of funds that do so appears to be quite small,102 and it is unlikely that the 
average retail investor is capable of identifying outperformers. 
Nonetheless, investors continue to purchase higher-fee funds. The rea-
son for this behavior is unclear.103 Some investors appear to believe that 
higher fees are correlated with better performance, in accordance with the 
adage “you get what you pay for.”104 Other investors appear to underestimate 
 
98 See generally Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and Perfor-
mance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153 (2009); John A. Haslem, H. Kent Baker & 
David M. Smith, Identification and Performance of Equity Mutual Funds with High Management Fees 
and Expense Ratios, 16 J. INVESTING, Summer 2007, at 32; Cooper, Halling & Lemmon, supra note 
96. 
99 Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 51 J. OF 
FIN. 783, 789-91 (1996). 
100 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009) (finding that the most active 
funds, as opposed to closet indexers, can outperform their benchmarks net of fees); see also 
Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to 
Earnings Announcements, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1111, 1129-30 (2010) (concluding 
that mutual fund managers are able to trade profitably in part because they are able to forecast 
earnings-related fundamentals); Robert Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? 
New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2553 (2006) (finding that a sizable minority 
of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs). 
101 See Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594-95 (2004) (“After taking into account transaction costs and 
taxes, investors may generate superior returns by following a naive buy-and-hold approach rather 
than a performance-chasing strategy, even if short-term performance is predictable.”); Mark M. 
Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 81 (1997) (finding that the best-
performing fund managers are “glamorize[d]” and the “mundane explanations of strategy and 
investment costs account for almost all of the important predictability in mutual fund returns”); 
Ronald N. Kahn & Andrew Rudd, Does Historical Performance Predict Future Performance?, 51 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 43, 51 (1995) (finding that “the average underperformance of 
fixed-income funds more than cancels out the benefits of being able to choose above-average funds 
through persistence alone”). 
102 See, e.g., Laurent Barras, Olivier Scaillet & Russ Wermers, False Discoveries in Mutual Fund 
Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179, 181 (2010) (finding that “the 
proportion of skilled funds decreases from 14.4% in early 1990 to 0.6% in late 2006”). 
103 The empirical findings may be complicated by the fact that some mutual fund fees are 
directly used to market funds. Studies have shown that loads and 12b-1 fees have a positive effect 
on market share. See Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, What Drives Market Share in the Mutual Fund 
Industry?, 16 REV. FIN. 81, 110-11 (2012). 
104 See Neil Weinberg, Fund Manager Knows Best, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 220, 220-21 (cit-
ing findings that eighty-four percent of investors believe higher-fee funds are better performers). 
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the economic significance of fund fees.105 And for others, fees may be 
presented in a manner that is too complex or difficult to find.106 As former 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt testified before Congress in 1998, “Our own 
research shows that fewer than one in five fund investors could give any 
estimate of expenses for their largest mutual fund and fewer than one in six 
fund investors understood that higher expenses can lead to lower returns.”107  
These studies offer reason to question the degree to which the mutual 
fund market is competitive, despite investors’ ability to redeem mutual fund 
shares at any time for their net asset value and to replace those funds with 
others that are competitively priced.108 The law of one price suggests that 
similar products should have similar prices and that fee dispersion should 
not persist unless products are truly different.109 Nonetheless, substantial 
price dispersion persists in the mutual fund market—price dispersion that 
does not appear to be explained by product differences.110 One recent study 
found that, after controlling for fund characteristics, “the average spread in 
 
105 See John Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual Funds 
Choices? (finding that their “subjects’ portfolio choices do not respond sensibly to loads and 
redemption fees”), in EXPLORATIONS IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 75, 76 (David A. Wise 
ed., 2011). One recent study finds that investors overwhelmingly rely on funds’ past performance 
rather than cost information, and they select funds with high past performance even when cost 
information is completely omitted. See Beth A. Pontari, Andrea J.S. Stanaland & Tom Smythe, 
Regulating Information Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising in the United States: Will Consumers 
Utilize Cost Information?, 32 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 333-34 (2009). 
106 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The 
Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2117 (2005) (finding that investors have 
learned to reject high load funds but continue to ignore operating expenses); see also Mark 
Grinblatt et al., IQ and Mutual Fund Choice 35 (May 14 2013) (unpublished working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021957 (finding that investors with high IQs tend to avoid 
higher-fee funds). But see James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Why Does the Law 
of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1430 (2010) 
(finding that almost none of the subjects minimized fees despite reporting the importance of fees, 
and that minimizing search costs only modestly improved portfolio allocations). 
107 Improving Price Competition for Mutual Funds and Bonds, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
And Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 37 (1998) (statement of Hon. 
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC). 
108 A number of articles argue that the mutual fund market is competitive. See, e.g., Khorana 
& Servaes, supra note 103, at 110 (finding that higher-fee fund families have lower market shares); 
Sunil Wahal & Albert (Yan) Wang, Competition Among Mutual Funds, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 40, 58 
(2011) (finding that the mutual fund market, at least after 1998, has been competitive and that the 
price competition introduced by new entrants reduces management fees).  
109 See Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra note 106, at 1406 (questioning whether demand for 
nonportfolio services can justify higher fees). 
110 See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 10, at 63 (“Despite the fact that the actual services 
of [mutual] funds are roughly the same, and their performance cannot be considered a significant 
factor in investor choice, the expense ratios vary widely.”); see also Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra 
note 106, at 1411 (noting substantial fee variation among index funds that are designed to follow an 
identical and largely mechanical investment strategy). 
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residual fees (between the 1st and 99th percentile) across all funds over the 
sample [was] 2.34%.”111 Another study found that, even in the absence of 
product differences, investors failed to minimize fees.112 
B. Diversification 
In addition to evidence that investors do not choose funds based on 
price, there is some evidence that investors do not choose at all—instead, 
they simply divide their money among the available options, an approach 
that has been termed “naïve diversification.”113 Benartzi and Thaler first 
demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of experiments in 2001.114 They 
found that subjects who were asked to make investment decisions had a 
strong inclination to spread their money, essentially investing 1/n into each 
of the n funds that was offered as investment choices, irrespective of the 
particular choice set or the attributes of the options at hand.115  
Research has also demonstrated that investors formulate their asset 
allocation decisions based on the alternatives provided rather than by 
independently determining an appropriate allocation.116 This approach has 
been termed the “menu effect.”117 The menu effect, coupled with naïve 
diversification, may lead investors to fail to reject even unattractive invest-
ment options. If investors do not reject less attractive options, offering them 
a range of choices will not prevent poor investment decisions and may even 
counterproductively induce them.  
Finally, as noted above, policies that favor choice may be misguided, 
given the evidence of the effect that too many choices have on decisionmak-
ing quality. Investors express a preference for choosing from a large 
assortment of products,118 but it is not clear that more choice is better for 
investors’ retirement accounts. First, increasing the number of investment 
 
111 Cooper, Halling & Lemmon, supra note 96, at 4. 
112 Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra note 106, at 1430.  
113 Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribu-
tion Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (2001). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 96. 
116 See Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant Portfolio Choices in 401(k) 
Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073, 1081 (2010) (finding that investors fail to construct efficient 
retirement portfolios, where efficiency is defined as maximizing the risk-adjusted return, and that 
individual allocation strategies are even less efficient than using a 1/n heuristic). 
117 Maureen Morrin et al., Saving for Retirement: The Effects of Fund Assortment Size and Inves-
tor Knowledge on Asset Allocation Strategies, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 206, 214 (2008). 
118 Id. at 207.  
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options increases investors’ tendency to invest in a large number of funds.119 
Second, and more problematic, increasing the amount of choice actually 
may lower employee participation rates. In one recent article, researchers 
looked at a broad collection of data on investment decisions made by over 
500,000 employees and found that increasing the number of investment 
options decreased both equity allocation and overall investment levels.120  
C. Proposed Mechanisms and Proposed Solutions for Investor Mistakes 
Although the empirical literature identifies a variety of possible short-
comings in investor decisionmaking, the precise mechanisms driving 
investors to choose high-fee funds remain unclear. One possibility is that 
investment disclosure is inadequate. The SEC has repeatedly revised and 
refined its disclosure requirements for mutual funds in an effort to address 
the concern that investors do not choose their funds rationally.121 Yet one of 
the more recent studies to examine the effectiveness of these reforms found 
that the introduction of a shorter and simplified “summary prospectus” had 
no effect on investor behavior.122 
Another possibility is that investors are inadequately informed about the 
task at hand or the fundamentals of investing. When investing for retire-
ment, for example, employees are not typically provided with instructions 
such as the appropriate number of options to choose or the correct alloca-
tion between equity and fixed income. Investors do not receive training in 
the difference between active and passive management. Investors are not 
even instructed as to the importance of fees in selecting among investment 
alternatives. At an even more basic level, people are confused about the 
math. Finance scholars Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell noted that 
half of the participants in a demographically diverse sample failed to realize 
that mutual funds do not pay a guaranteed rate of return,123 and found that 
 
119 See Morrin et al., Investing for Retirement: The Moderating Effect of Fund Assortment 
Size of the 1/n Heuristic 27 ( Jan. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1008841 (“[C]onsidering a larger number of funds to invest in may be over-
whelming for many investors, resulting in choosing more funds for investment and allocating the 
invested dollars evenly across the chosen funds.”). 
120 Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset 
Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 530-38 (2010). 
121 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1968-69 (describing various SEC revisions to mutual fund 
disclosure requirements). 
122 Beshears et al., supra note 105, at 90.  
123 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness: 
Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, BUS. ECON., Jan. 2007, at 35, 37. 
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fewer than twenty percent could correctly calculate a simple compound 
interest problem.124 
Even ideal disclosure requirements will have limited effectiveness, 
though, if investors are unable to use the information provided.125 Lack of 
investor education or overtaxed cognitive resources might explain the 
inability of investors to estimate the costs associated with a one percent 
difference in fees, for example, or the willingness of investors, even post-
Enron, to invest a substantial portion of their retirement accounts in 
company stock. To the extent that these shortcomings are due to behavioral 
biases, little effort has been made to overcome them.126 The literature 
continually identifies the inability of investors to demonstrate a basic 
understanding of investment principles, but little effort has been devoted to 
determining how to improve that understanding.  
Understanding the reasons for existing investor behavior is critical to 
designing more effective regulatory approaches. As noted above, Congress 
recognized as much when, as part of Dodd–Frank, it required the SEC to 
conduct a study of investor financial literacy.127 The report of the study, 
which the SEC released on August 30, 2012,128 was a disappointment. 
Although Congress had directed the SEC to identify the existing level of 
financial literacy among retail investors and to study such issues as design-
ing more effective disclosure and identifying a strategy to improve financial 
literacy, the SEC’s efforts were extremely limited. 
The study concluded that U.S. retail investors “lack basic financial liter-
acy.”129 Nevertheless, the SEC focused primarily on investor preferences 
rather than attempting to identify mechanisms to improve the quality of 
 
124 Id. at 38 fig.1.  
125 See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 521, 568-83 (2009) (arguing that, in the absence of investor education, SEC disclosure 
rules do not lead investors to make better investment decisions). 
126 In the one area in which such biases seem clear—the tendency of investors to place undue 
weight on past performance—the regulatory response has been tepid. Rather than limiting 
advertisements highlighting past performance, despite their substantial influence on investment 
decisions, the SEC simply requires such advertisements to contain language informing investors 
that “past performance does not guarantee future results.” Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter & 
Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Adver-
tisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 441-55 (2010) (explaining that advertising past 
performance is highly effective and demonstrating that the current SEC disclaimer is too weak). 
127 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,  
§ 917, 124 Stat. 1376, 1836 (2010). 
128 Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Financial Literacy Study Mandated by the Dodd–Frank 
Act (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/ 
1365171484290#.UlAkO2TwJ8k. 
129 SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 3, at iii.  
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investor decisions. For example, the SEC conducted a substantial online 
survey in which subjects were given investment information to review.130 
The survey questioned the investors not on their understanding of the 
material provided, but rather on their perception of the presentation and 
complexity of the information provided. For example, rather than trying to 
determine whether investors could reliably locate information contained in a 
summary prospectus, the SEC asked them whether they found it difficult to 
locate the information that they needed.131 
Although the SEC study offered little of practical value, an improved 
understanding of retail investor decisionmaking would assist regulators in 
improving the manner in which $18.5 trillion of U.S. retirement assets are 
invested.132 This information could also assist employers in designing 
retirement plans to optimize allocation decisions by employees. Furthering 
these objectives requires untangling the reasons for investor mistakes: Do 
investors fail to identify the proper objectives? Are they unable to locate the 
information that they need? Or are they unable to evaluate that information 
accurately? Our experiment, described in the next Part, offers an initial step 
toward obtaining this understanding.  
III. OUR EXPERIMENT 
To increase understanding of how retail investors make investment deci-
sions, we designed an experiment to simulate the process of allocating a 
retirement account among a selection of mutual funds. For our experiment, 
we created a web-based user interface to provide subjects with ten fictional 
mutual fund choices. Information about each of the choices was provided 
through clickable links. Investors allocated an investment among the ten 
funds and our software recorded their decisions. In addition, our software 
required investors to click through the website in order to obtain specific 
information about fund choices and their attributes. By collecting and 
analyzing these clicks, we were able to identify the information that inves-
tors reviewed. After the subjects submitted their allocations, we collected 
additional survey information about the subjects’ beliefs, risk preferences, 
and investment experience, as well as demographic information. 
 
130 Investors were given summary prospectuses of several actual mutual funds, but the fund 
names were changed to the fictitious “Petunia Core Equity,” “Gardenia Asset Allocation Portfolio,” 
and “Hydrangea Bush Government Bond Fund.” Id. at 98-99. 
131 Id. at 100-01. 
132 PETER BRADY, KIMBERLY BURHAM & SARAH HOLDEN, INV. CO. INST., THE 
SUCCESS OF THE U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM 10-12 & fig.4 (2012), available at http:// 
www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf (reporting U.S. retirement assets as of June 30, 2012). 
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A. Study Design 
Subjects were instructed to allocate an initial $10,000 among the ten 
fund choices. The experiment did not permit subjects to submit an alloca-
tion unless their allocations totaled exactly 100% of the $10,000. The subjects 
were told that they were investing for retirement and that the overall value 
of their portfolios would be calculated based on a simulated thirty-year 
performance. We attempted to provide an incentive for subjects to allocate 
carefully by instructing them that they would be paid a bonus based on the 
performance of the portfolio that they chose.133 
Our fund allocation page (Figure 1) listed the ten mutual fund choices. 
By clicking on the fund name, subjects accessed a fund information page 
(Figure 2) that provided a brief description of the fund. In turn, the fund 
information page contained four buttons allowing subjects to obtain infor-
mation on four specific fund attributes: performance, risk, fees, and hold-
ings. Each button allowed subjects to click through to obtain more detailed 
information (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 1: Fund Allocation Page 
 
 
 
 
 
133 See infra Section III.B for a description of the performance bonuses paid to each group of 
subjects. 
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Figure 2: Fee Information Page, Money Market Fund 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Performance Information, Money Market Fund 
 
 
 
The information provided for each fund was presented in an identical 
and highly simplified format. Our study focused on information- and 
motivation-based reasons for investor mistakes rather than on cognitive 
reasons for such mistakes. As a result, we highlighted the information that 
might conceivably be relevant to the investment decision and made that 
information directly comparable across the fund options. 
Performance information included a graph showing the fund’s ten-year 
performance as well as the performance of the S&P 500 (over the same 
hypothetical time period) and a chart showing annualized one-, three-, and 
five-year returns. Fee information consisted of a single number showing the 
fund’s current expense ratio. Our study was specifically constructed to 
reduce the likelihood that investors would make choices based on confusion 
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or inability to understand the fee disclosure.134 Risk description language 
was taken from real mutual fund prospectuses, and the holdings page listed 
each fund’s top ten holdings and showed the percentage of fund assets 
invested in each—again modeled on actual funds. 
As noted above, the funds in the experiment were modeled on real world 
funds—fee levels, holdings, and descriptive language were taken from real 
mutual fund documents. The choice to construct fictional funds was driven 
in part by a desire to avoid the potentially distortionary effect of the 2008 
Financial Crisis on reported fund performance. In addition, using fictional 
funds also enabled us to control the degree to which funds differed from 
each other. For example, we constructed several fund pairs that varied across 
only a single dimension, such as fees. 
We gave our funds generic names such as the Smith Fund, much like 
those used in the SEC study of investor literacy,135 to avoid the possibility 
that investors would infer information about fund style or strategy from the 
names of the funds.136 On the fund allocation page, we also randomly varied 
the order in which funds appeared within their fund categories. A simplified 
presentation of fund attributes appears in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 We did not include loads, 12b-1 fees, sponsor fee waivers, or other types of expenses. John 
Haslem, Kent Baker, and David Smith have argued that investors lack the information they need 
to make efficient fund choices because the expense ratio does not break out all costs or include all 
cost categories. Haslem, Baker & Smith, supra note 98, at 34-37.  
135 See supra note 130. 
136 See Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, Changing Names with Style: 
Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825, 2825, 2827 (2005) 
(finding investors directed money into funds that changed their names to reflect a “hot investment 
style”). 
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Table 1: Fund Attributes 
 
Fund Type 
Five-year
Return Fees
1 Money Market 2.89% .43%
2 Money Market 2.91% .43%
3 Fixed Income 7.50% .87%
4 Fixed Income 5.41% .83%
5 Equity Index 8.67% .10%
6 Equity Index 8.62% .45%
7 Managed Equity 9.10% .61%
8 Managed Equity 8.67% .61%
9 Managed Equity 9.00% 1.62%
10 Managed Equity 9.70% 2.10%
 
We collected information on how subjects allocated their $10,000 as well 
as the specific clicks that each subject made in order to view additional 
information about the funds. After the subjects submitted their allocations, 
they were asked to answer a series of questions about their investment 
beliefs, risk preferences, and investment experience. Subjects were also 
asked to supply demographic information and to identify “the most im-
portant factor in [their] choice of retirement funds in this study.”  
After completing the questionnaire, subjects received a message showing 
the final value of their retirement portfolio. The website calculated this 
value by using a rough algorithm that simulated fund returns over thirty 
years. Returns were ranked by asset class.137 Consistent with our hypothesis, 
funds within each class were ranked so that funds with lower fees yielded 
higher returns. Because we were agnostic, for the purposes of this study, 
about the relative merits of professionally managed funds versus passive 
indexing,138 we structured the returns of our lowest-cost index fund and 
 
137 Equity funds paid a higher return than bond funds, which paid more than money market 
funds. Our algorithm also included an adjustment factor for risk, a component of our experiment 
that will be analyzed in a separate article.  
138 Commentators generally agree that retail investors should prefer passively managed funds 
both because of their lower costs and because investors lack the ability to select among mutual 
fund managers. See, e.g., Rick Ferri, Indexes Beat Active Funds Again in S&P Study, FORBES (Oct. 
11, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickferri/2012/10/11/indexes-beat-active-funds-again-in-sp-
study (detailing the consistent underperformance of actively managed funds and portfolios). 
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actively managed equity fund to be identical on a cost-adjusted basis. The 
distribution of possible portfolio values and fees is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Possible Fees and Payouts 
 
Maximum portfolio value (100% invested in highest  
performing fund) 
$76,120 
Minimum portfolio value (100% invested in lowest 
performing fund) 
$15,630 
Portfolio value with 10% invested in each fund $38,989–$49,543 
Maximum fee (100% invested in highest fee fund) 2.10% 
Minimum fee (100% invested in lowest fee fund) .10% 
Average fee (effective fee with 10% invested in each fund) .81% 
B. Subjects 
Our study drew from two subject pools. Table 3 contains basic demo-
graphic information on each group of subjects. The first group of subjects 
consisted of undergraduate students, graduate students, and some staff 
members who took the study at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton 
Behavioral Lab (WBL). The WBL draws primarily undergraduate subjects 
from across the University of Pennsylvania campus. Its subjects are not 
limited to students affiliated with the Wharton business program. 
The second group of subjects signed up through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) and took the study online. Although some scholars have 
raised questions about the external validity of online subject pools like 
MTurk that pay subjects very small amounts of money for completing 
minor tasks and short questionnaires,139 others have found that they are 
comparable to other survey panels.140 Our goal in this study was to simulate 
the allocation decision faced by ordinary employees when choosing among 
investment options in their 401(k) plans. Using subjects who may have 
 
139 See Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, Why Labour Market Experiments?, 10 LAB. ECON. 399, 402 
(2003) (exploring the role of stake levels in experimental pools); see also Ernst Fehr & John A. 
List, The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs, 2 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N 743, 764-65 (2004) (finding differences in the behavior of students and CEOs in 
studies concerning the effect of incentives). 
140 See, e.g., Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 412 (2010) (“Internet 
subject populations tend to be closer to the U.S. population as a whole than subjects recruited 
from traditional university subject pools.”).  
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below-average means or sophistication is appropriate for a study that seeks 
to describe and address the investment choices of employees with little 
specialized knowledge or investment experience.141 
 
Table 3: Subject Demographics, by Subject Pool 
 
 MTurk WBL 
Total number of subjects 197 201 
Median age 32 20 
Percent female 52% 67% 
Percent owning a mutual fund 43.1% 12.9% 
Percent owning a retirement account 54.9% 8.5% 
Percent with college education  58.4% 33.8% 
Percent reporting somewhat to very 
stable income
67.0% 71.6% 
 
We incentivized our subjects to select funds carefully by providing a 
performance-based bonus. MTurk participants were paid a base rate of one 
dollar for completing the study and an additional one dollar bonus if their 
portfolio values were above the median in their subject pool. Subjects who 
participated in the study via the WBL were paid a ten dollar showup fee for 
a session that included this experiment as well as other studies. Participants 
were instructed that they would also receive bonus payments proportionate 
to their total portfolio values at the end of the session—one dollar for every 
$10,000 in their portfolios (rounded to the nearest quarter). 
C. Experimental Manipulation 
We focus on investors’ consideration of fees in their allocation decisions, 
in part because of the extensive controversy over the extent to which 
investment decisions provide market discipline and in part because of the 
legal implications of the answer to this question. To test the potential for 
education to affect investors’ consideration of fees, our study contained an 
experimental manipulation. Specifically, we divided our subjects randomly 
into three groups—Performance, Fees, and Control. We provided subjects 
 
141 We note that the self-reported education level of MTurk subjects is higher than that of 
the general population. See id. 
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in the Fees group with an instruction designed to focus investors’ attention 
on the importance of considering fee information in the selection process.  
The Fees Condition Instruction read as follows: 
In making your investment decision, you may want to consider the follow-
ing information: the most important single factor in mutual fund perfor-
mance is the fund’s operating expenses (in other words, its fees). 
We provided subjects in the Performance Group with an instruction 
comparable to the instruction required by the SEC.  
The Performance Condition Instruction read as follows: 
In making your investment decision, you may want to consider the follow-
ing information: studies have shown that past performance does not predict 
future returns. 
Subjects in the Control group did not receive any additional instruction. 
Because of the complex relationship between fees and performance, as 
noted in Part II above, we consider the effect of the performance instruction 
in other work. We report here only on the comparison of the Fees Group 
and the Control Group.  
As a robustness check, we also asked participants who received a special 
instruction in the questionnaire portion of the experiment to identify the 
instruction they received from a list of seven alternatives.142 
IV. STUDY RESULTS 
A. Overall Descriptive Results 
We report data from 197 MTurk subjects and 201 WBL subjects. Because 
of the demographic differences between our groups, we report results 
separately. Basic descriptive results, which also reflect some significant 
differences between the two subject groups, are reported in Table 4 below. 
To summarize, our overall results provide a basis for guarded optimism. 
First, we found that investors understood the general objectives and design 
of the study. They invested, in the aggregate, the most money in the two 
funds that we had designed to be the most efficient investment options: the 
low-cost equity index fund and the low-cost actively managed fund. Second, 
we found that investors diversified—probably excessively—but that there 
 
142 49.2% of the MTurk participants and 57.2% of the WBL participants correctly identified 
the special instruction they received.  
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was segmentation within our investor pool. Third, we found that the fee 
instruction mattered. These results are considered in more detail below. 
 
Table 4: Basic Descriptive Means, by Subject Pool 
 
 MTurk WBL 
Minutes logged in 12.70 11.30 
Total clicks 34.30 59.00 
Mean clicks on fees 6.86 11.77 
Mean clicks on risk 4.70 9.32 
Mean clicks on holdings 3.25 7.08 
Mean clicks on performance 7.98 13.76 
Total number of funds invested in 6.39 7.33 
Percent investing in all ten funds 27.9% 32.4% 
Percent correctly identifying own condition 49.2% 57.2% 
Average portfolio value $47,679 $48,839 
Average pay $1.50 $4.91 
 
As shown in Table 4, the WBL subjects accessed a much higher quantity 
of information, clicking through many more links. The MTurk subjects 
invested in fewer overall funds and were less likely to invest in all ten funds. 
We also note here, as is reflected in the significance tests below, that there is 
generally more variance in the data from the MTurk subjects. 
Figure 4 shows the mean investment across conditions in each fund. Fig-
ure 5 shows the overall distribution across subjects of the debt/equity split.  
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Figure 4: Histogram Showing Mean Percentage (Aggregated Across  
Conditions) of Portfolio Invested in Each Fund, by Subject Pool 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Histogram Showing Mean Percentage (Aggregated Across  
Conditions) of Total Portfolio Invested in Equity, by Subject Pool 
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B. Investment Patterns 
Before discussing the results of our experimental manipulation, we ob-
serve some overall patterns in how subjects chose funds across conditions in 
order to get a sense of subjects’ baseline preferences and strategies. First, we 
note that most subjects chose a reasonable debt/equity balance.143 In addi-
tion, the most popular investments were the two investments that should 
have been the most attractive—the low-fee index fund and the low-fee 
managed fund. Figure 5 shows the mean investment in each fund, by 
subject pool. Note that Figure 6 shows the means aggregated across condi-
tions, but the overall pattern is the same if we look only at subjects in the 
Control group. 
Second, we see substantial evidence of a strong preference for diversifi-
cation, naïve or otherwise.144 From these patterns of investment, it seems 
clear that subjects were not trying to pick funds. We expected that investors 
would attempt to identify the best fund in each category and then invest in 
a total of two or three funds, depending on the extent to which they wanted 
to diversify between fixed income and equity, and between passive and 
active investment strategies—subjects about which we remained agnostic for 
purposes of this study. Instead, we found that only 7.5% of WBL and 17.8% 
of MTurk subjects chose three or fewer funds.  
The results on diversification are less discouraging than they might ap-
pear from the aggregated statistics. Specifically, we see segmentation within 
our subject pools. As Figure 4 demonstrates, our aggregate results on 
diversification combine different investment patterns. In the WBL pool, for 
example, about a third of subjects invested in four to six funds total, and 
only a third invested in all ten funds. Although the subjects who invested in 
all ten funds—those who diversified most naïvely—do not appear to differ 
from our other subjects along the dimensions captured by our study, we 
suspect that these are different kinds of investors and that this market may 
be segmented in some important ways that we flag here for future research.  
More problematic, naïve diversification may explain a number of in-
vestment decisions that otherwise appear irrational or uninformed. For 
example, our study contained two index funds that were described as 
identical except for fees—they tracked the same index, contained the same 
holdings, and reported the same past performance. Overall, 74.6% of WBL 
participants and 65.2% of MTurk participants who invested in the low-fee 
index fund also invested in the high-fee index fund. Similarly, 68% of 
 
143 See supra Figure 5. 
144 See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. 
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MTurk investors allocated at least some money to a higher-fee actively 
managed fund that was really just a closet index fund, in that its holdings 
and performance were identical to those reported by the index funds. This 
was also true of 74.1% of WBL subjects. On a somewhat different point, 
79.6% of WBL and 74.1% of MTurk investors allocated at least some money 
to a money market fund. They did so despite the instruction to invest for a 
thirty-year time frame for which liquidity concerns should be minimal. 
Notably, the reported returns of the money market funds were significantly 
lower than the other fixed income alternatives. 
C. Response to Fee Instruction 
In this Section, we analyze the effect of the fee instruction on subjects’ 
beliefs and choices. Here, we compare the responses of the seventy-two 
WBL subjects assigned to the Fees condition with the responses of the sixty 
subjects assigned to the Control condition. Separately, we compare the 
responses of sixty-four MTurk subjects in the Fees condition with sixty-five 
in the Control condition.145 As noted above, we exclude subjects in the 
Performance group from this set of analyses.146  
We found that investors who received the fee instruction differed from 
the Control group along three dimensions. First, they sought more infor-
mation about fees. Second, they reported believing that fees were more 
important. Third, they shifted their allocations toward lower-cost funds.147 
1. Search for Information: Fee Clicks 
The fee disclosure significantly affected how subjects collected and used 
fee information. As Table 5 indicates, subjects in the Fees group were much 
more likely to look at a fund’s fees. On average, WBL subjects in the Fees 
group clicked forty percent more on the fees buttons—meaning that they 
 
145 We also analyzed gender differences. Men and women in the WBL subject pool did not 
differ on any of the primary dependent variables, including portfolio composition and clicking 
patterns. Women in the MTurk pool invested significantly more in safe (fixed income) funds than 
men did (34.8% versus 27.4%, p=.015). 
146 As a general matter, the behavior of those subjects who received the Performance instruc-
tion was similar to that of the Control group. For our primary variables, including fee clicks, 
average fee paid, and the importance of fees and investment in the lowest and highest fee funds, 
the results of the Performance group were statistically indistinguishable from the Control group. 
The Performance instruction did generate marginal differences in the investors’ allocation among 
the various funds.  
147 All statistical tests reported here are two-sided t-tests, comparing the variable means 
across conditions. We report the results of the main statistical tests of significance in tables, 
including means, t-statistics, degrees of freedom (d.f.), and p-value. 
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viewed fee information forty percent more often—than subjects in the 
control group. The increase was even more dramatic for subjects from the 
MTurk pool, where subjects in the Fees group clicked on the fee disclosure 
more than twice as often as subjects in the Control group. In both subject 
pools, the fee instruction caused investors to search for more fee infor-
mation than did the Control group. 
 
Table 5: Fee Clicks by Condition, for WBL and MTurk Samples 
 
 Fees 
Group Mean 
Control 
Group Mean t d.f. p 
Fee clicks, WBL 14.82 10.40 3.10 129.62 .002 
Fee clicks, MTurk 9.36 4.09 4.37 101.87 .000 
 
2. Beliefs About the Importance of Fees 
The fee instruction also affected subjects’ beliefs about the importance 
of fund fees. We report group means and significance statistics for WBL 
participants in Table 6, and for MTurk participants in Table 7. The effects 
were very similar across subject pools. Overall, in both subject pools, 
subjects in the Fees condition were less likely than subjects in the Control 
group to agree that a fund’s fees do not affect returns and were substantially 
more likely to report that operating expenses were the most important 
factor in fund performance.  
The most dramatic impact of the fee instruction was on the subjects’ 
self-reported identification of the most important criterion in their selection 
among the investment alternatives. In both subject pools, the instruction 
caused a significant reduction in the number of subjects who reported 
diversification as the most important consideration and a corresponding 
increase in the percentage of subjects who reported that fees were the most 
important consideration. Notably, the fee instruction appeared to be new 
information to the MTurk subjects, as well as to the Wharton students, 
despite the fact that the MTurk subjects were significantly more experi-
enced investors, with more than half reporting that they have a retirement 
account. 
 
 
 
 
  
2014] Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? 639 
 
Table 6: Beliefs and Preferences by Condition, WBL Subjects 
 
 
Fees 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean t d.f. p 
Fees do not affect returns 3.04 3.53 1.97 129.99 .051 
Operating expenses most 
important in performance
4.31 3.16 4.38 129.35 .000 
Most important is fees 27.8% 6.7% 3.39 114.67 .001 
Most important is diversity 30.6% 53.3% 2.68 121.53 .008 
 
Table 7: Beliefs and Preferences by Condition, MTurk Subjects 
 
 
Fees 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean t d.f. p 
Fees do not affect returns 2.61 3.48 3.43 124.22 .001 
Operating expenses most 
important in performance
4.28 3.25 4.75 85.95 .000 
Most important is fees 35.9% 4.6% 4.75 85.95 .000 
Most important is diversity 31.3% 50.8% 2.27 126.55 .024 
 
3. Fund Selection 
Because our experiment required our subjects to make an investment 
decision, the effect of the fee instruction on that decision is arguably the 
most important component of our experiment. It is arguably also the most 
important aspect of our study with respect to real-world policy choices, in 
that it measures the potential ability of an instruction to affect investor 
behavior rather than simply attitudes or beliefs. Because of the importance 
of this question, we designed our study to measure potential effects in several 
ways. Results are summarized in Table 8 (WBL) and Table 9 (MTurk). 
First, for each subject, we determined the asset-weighted average mutual 
fund fee that the subject’s account would have paid at the time of the 
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subject’s investment allocation.148 For example, a subject who invested half 
of his money in a fund with a .1% fee and half in the fund with a 2.1% fee 
had an average fund fee of 1.1%. By this measure, the fee instruction had a 
clear impact. In both pools, subjects in the Fees group selected portfolios 
charging a lower average fee than subjects in the Control group. Perhaps 
more importantly, the average fee difference between conditions was signifi-
cant even when we look only at fees paid on equity funds (Funds 5-10). 
The fee instruction also affected the subjects’ choices among specific 
investment alternatives. The Fees group invested a higher percentage of 
their portfolio in the lowest-fee fund and a lower percentage of their 
portfolio in the highest-fee fund than the Control group (though the latter 
difference is not significant in the MTurk group). They also invested more 
in index funds and less in managed funds than their Control counterparts. 
Notably, those in the Fees group invested more in the lower-fee index fund 
than those in the Control group, but they did not invest more in the higher-
fee index fund than those in the Control group, suggesting that their 
investment shift resulted from a concern about fees rather than a preference 
for passively—over actively—managed funds.  
 
Table 8: Fund Selection by Condition, WBL 
 
 
Fees 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean t d.f. p 
Average Total Fees Paid  
(asset-weighted) 
.66% .80% 3.27 129.50 .001 
Average Fees Paid in Equity 
(asset-weighted) 
.70% .84% 2.61 129.77 .010 
Index Funds (5-6) 34.12 25.55 2.70 129.77 .008 
Managed Funds (7-10) 40.81 48.40 2.46 129.90 .015 
Fixed Income Funds (3-4) 13.76 16.58 1.74 129.99 .085 
Money Market (1-2) 18.44 16.14 1.17 126.44 .246 
Average Percent of Portfolio 
Invested in Lowest-Fee Fund 
23.50% 15.70% 3.18 119.20 .002 
Average Percent of Portfolio 
Invested in Highest-Fee Fund
7.15% 11.42% 2.31 115.34 .022 
 
148 Differences in fund performance would cause the average fee to vary over the thirty years 
of the simulation. 
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Table 9: Fund Selection by Condition, MTurk 
 
 
Fees 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean t d.f. p 
Average Total Fees Paid  
(asset-weighted) 
.68% .79% 2.21 125.60 .028 
Average Fees Paid in Equity  
(asset-weighted) 
.70% .84% 2.32 124.29 .023 
Index Funds (5-6)  29.76 22.45 2.01 118.40 .047 
Managed Funds (7-10) 38.65 46.85 1.93 120.41 .056 
Fixed Income Funds (3-4) 12.38 13.82 1.20 126.97 .232 
Money Market funds (1-2) 19.21 15.88 1.11 112.47 .268 
Average Percent of Portfolio 
Invested in Lowest-Fee Fund 
21.10% 13.90% 2.17 115.94 .032 
Average Percent of Portfolio 
Invested in Highest-Fee Fund
7.55% 10.42% 1.38 126.08 .170 
 
D. Diversification 
Finally, we considered the extent to which the fee instruction affected 
the propensity of the subjects to engage in a naïve diversification strategy. 
Table 10 compares the concentration of funds by condition, using a concen-
tration measure based on each fund’s Euclidean distance from the perfectly 
even distribution.149 This concentration measure assesses the degree to 
which a subject’s portfolio differed from the naïve 1/n investment strategy.150  
The results here illustrate most dramatically the limitations of our fee 
instruction. For both subject pools, subjects in the Fees group had more 
concentrated portfolios than those in the Control group—that is, their 
 
149 See Beshears et al., supra note 105, at 87-88 (using a similar experimental design). Concen-
tration is measured by the square root of the sum of the squared differences between the actual 
allocations and the even distribution (.10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10). The most diversi-
fied portfolio would be zero, and the most concentrated portfolio (100% in one fund, 0 in nine 
funds) is .949. 
150 We also measured diversification using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, typically em-
ployed to measure the concentration of market power in an industry, which simply sums the 
squared percentage allocated to each fund. Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). This measure also 
yielded statistically significant differences in concentration by condition, at p=.028 for the WBL 
subject pool and p=.067 for the MTurk pool.  
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portfolios looked less like the paradigmatic naïvely diversified allocation. 
However, even though both groups’ allocations were more concentrated, 
subjects did not actually invest in significantly fewer total funds. MTurk 
subjects invested a positive amount in a median of six total funds, and the 
median for WBL subjects was even higher, at eight total funds. In both 
cases, the mean number of funds invested in was slightly lower for the Fees 
group than for the Control group, but not significantly so. In addition, 
although subjects responded to the instruction by reducing their allocations 
to high-fee funds, they did not shift out of high-fee funds entirely. 
 
Table 10: Concentration of Investments, by Condition,  
for Both Subject Pools 
 
 
Fees 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean t d.f. p 
Concentration, WBL .333 .287 1.98 128.47 .050 
Concentration, MTurk .376 .315 1.75 122.78 .082 
 
E. Robustness: Subjects with Investment Experience 
In our last analysis, we consider how the fee instruction affected a par-
ticular subgroup of subjects who we predict would be less in need of inves-
tor education. Because the MTurk subjects were not primarily drawn from a 
student population, we look here specifically at the subgroup of the sample 
who had investment experience. Of the 197 MTurk subjects, 54.8% reported 
that they had a retirement account for which they made investment deci-
sions. Noting at the outset that tests of the experimental manipulation on 
this subgroup are less powerful because the sample size is smaller, we found 
that the fee instruction affected decisionmaking even when investors were 
not entirely new to investing.  
Looking only at experienced investors, the fee instruction increased sub-
jects’ clicks on fee links from 3.9 to 8.7 clicks (t=3.14, d.f.=58.12, p=.003). 
Those who saw the fee instruction paid a significantly lower total fee (.63% 
vs. .75%) than those in the Control group (t=2.13, d.f.=71.00, p=.037). The 
instruction made subjects invest slightly, though not significantly, more in 
the lowest-fee fund (p=.237) and slightly less in the highest-fee fund (mean 
difference=3.8%, t=1.85, d.f.=64.16, p=.069). Experienced subjects in the 
Fees group were also much more likely to report that the most important 
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consideration was operating expenses, in comparison to experienced sub-
jects in the Control group (percent difference=30.8, t=3.46, d.f.=48.84, 
p=.001). 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
This study constitutes preliminary research. Consequently, our ability to 
generalize from our results is limited. As noted above, our study contained a 
number of simplifications and design choices that we will investigate further 
through additional research.  
In particular, we deliberately designed our study, in contrast to other 
experimental studies (and the real world of investing), to make fee infor-
mation simple, accessible, and comparable. Our simplification was designed 
to enable us to differentiate between a cognitive failure—the inability to 
understand fee information—and a motivational failure—indifference to 
fees even when the fee information is clear and available. Our results 
suggest that subjects who are not motivated to seek and use fee information 
will fail to do so even when cognitive barriers are minimal. 
The simplification of fee information, in the absence of a fee instruction, 
appeared to be of limited value. Without the fee instruction, our subjects 
tended to diversify among the investment options provided, to pay average 
fees, and to obtain average performance from their investments. This 
finding suggests that the SEC’s emphasis on improving disclosure, at least 
in the absence of improved investor education, may be misplaced. 
Our interpretation of these results is that investor ignorance of the eco-
nomic significance of mutual fund fees limits investors’ use of fee infor-
mation to choose among investment alternatives. Mutual fund fees are 
presented in fractions of a percent, and investors may assume that the real 
cost of such fees is negligible.151 Our study predicts that, if investors are 
instructed about the importance of fees, they will be more attentive to fees 
in choosing among funds. 
In a small follow-up study, we explored the extent to which inattention 
to fees might be the result of limited investor financial literacy. A two-
minute questionnaire asked subjects to estimate the difference in value of 
two thirty-year investments of $10,000 with an average (before fees) rate of 
 
151 Such an assumption is, of course, mistaken. An investor who invests $10,000 in a retire-
ment account that earns an 8% return (before fees) for thirty years and that charges a .5% fee will 
have more than $85,000 in retirement savings. If the fees are 2% instead, that same account will be 
worth less than $55,000. 
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return of 8%, one with a 1% fee, and the other with a 2% fee.152 The correct 
answer was approximately $20,000. The median response was $3000, and 
almost forty percent of subjects underestimated the effect of the fee by an 
order of magnitude. This is a very rough way to picture how individuals 
approach the complex compound interest problem. Nonetheless, it suggests 
a possible explanation for why investors do not change their behavior in 
response to simplified fee information: they do not think that fees, which 
seem very small, will have a big effect on funds’ returns. 
Limited investor understanding of the magnitude of the fee impact may 
also explain why our subjects’ response to the fee instruction was limited. 
Although the instruction stated that fees were important, it neither told 
investors why nor quantified the effect of a small fee differential. Even if 
investors are told that fees matter, our small study suggests that they may 
underestimate the importance of small fee differences. A more explicit 
instruction, such as one indicating that small differences in fees between 
funds can lead to payouts that differ by as much as thirty-five percent over 
the life of a retirement account, may have a greater effect on investor 
behavior. We intend, through future research, to experiment with varying 
the nature of the fee instruction in order to determine whether we can 
thereby improve its effectiveness.153 
Consistent with the literature, our findings about the extent of diversifi-
cation seem to confirm a high degree of naïve diversification. We are 
particularly troubled by the frequency with which investors allocate money 
to both members of a pair-wise set of funds in which one alternative is 
objectively inferior to the other. Our findings suggest that an employer’s 
burden in designing an appropriate 401(k) plan may be especially difficult 
because the inclusion of even a few poor or more costly investment choices 
in a plan can harm investors who are unable to identify and eliminate such 
funds. Our findings also suggest that investors do not fully understand the 
objective of diversification. Here, as with fees, we intend to explore the 
 
152 The study was a short survey on MTurk, in which 185 subjects were paid $.75 and half 
received a $.25 bonus for above-average accuracy. Before seeing the main question, they were told,  
When you buy shares of a mutual fund, as many people do when they choose a retire-
ment portfolio, a percentage of the investment goes toward the mutual fund’s annual 
operating expenses—in other words, mutual funds charge investors a yearly fee 
which is automatically deducted from investor accounts. In this task, you are being 
asked to estimate the total cost of a mutual fund’s fees over a long time period.  
They were instructed to answer the question quickly and without using a calculator.  
153 Cf. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 126, at 455 (conducting an experiment to vary the 
strength of performance disclaimers and finding that strongly worded disclaimers were more 
effective). 
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extent to which information and instructions can improve the quality of 
investor decisions.  
Our results with respect to both fees and diversification raise broader 
questions about the extent to which retail investors understand the invest-
ment process. Efficient retirement investing demands that investors under-
stand not only basic principles of costs and diversification, but also the 
effect of compounding, the value of asset allocation, and the consequences 
of these choices for investing over a thirty-year (or longer) time horizon. 
Our next study will focus to a larger degree on investor cognition in an 
effort to distinguish between investors’ failure to set appropriate objectives 
from their inability to meet their objectives. 
Our study raises a particular concern that investors (and employers as 
well) do not understand what they are supposed to do in investing for 
retirement. Given our subjects’ expressed levels of discomfort with the 
investment process, we predict that, rather than attempting to understand 
these concepts, investors search for short-cuts, heuristics, and opportunities 
to delegate. Indeed, studies show that an increasing number of retirement 
investors attempt to delegate their investment decisions by choosing 
actively managed mutual funds, target-date funds, or professionally man-
aged accounts.154 Delegating responsibility for investment decisions makes 
investors vulnerable to the choices of professionals—choices that may be 
opaque, shielded from market discipline, or tainted by conflicts of interest.  
The popularity of target-date funds in 401(k) plans is one example. Tar-
get-date funds provide investors with a gradual shift from equity to fixed 
income as the investor nears retirement age, thereby relieving investors of 
the burden of determining how to allocate their assets appropriately.155 
When the financial crisis hit, investors learned that different target-date 
funds had widely varied approaches to asset allocation and were far riskier 
than investors had believed.156 Similarly, target-date funds vary substantially 
 
154 See More 401(k) Participants Turning to Professionals for Help, FINANCIAL PLANNING 
( June 27, 2012), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/more-401k-participants-turning-to-
professional-for-help-vanguard-says-2679595-1.html (stating that more than one-third of 
Vanguard’s 401(k) plan participants turned their accounts over to professional money managers); 
Elizabeth O’Brien, 10 Things 401(k) Plans Won’t Tell You, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 23, 2013), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-401k-plans-wont-tell-you-2012-11-09 (reporting that 
employees invest almost three times as much money in actively managed equity funds as they do 
in index funds, despite the higher cost of actively managed funds). 
155 See Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Retirement Product Disclosure Rules and the Impact on Mutual 
Fund Distribution, 19 INVESTMENT LAW., Oct. 2012, at 26, 28-29 (discussing common investor 
misunderstandings regarding target-date funds). 
156 See id. (noting that these concerns led the SEC to develop a rulemaking proposal for 
target-date funds); see also Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund 
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in terms of fees and complexity—one article reports that fees range from 
less than .2% to more than 1%.157 Existing regulatory provisions encourage 
employees to invest in target-date funds, but our analysis suggests that, 
because these funds may purport to relieve investors of the need to evaluate 
costs and risks, employer obligations to screen such choices more carefully 
should perhaps be greater. 
Our study has important implications for plan design. Courts and com-
mentators, such as the Wal-Mart court, suggest that retirement plan design 
should focus on offering employees a broad array of choices that include 
several low-cost options. If investors do not avoid inferior investment 
options, however, the inclusion of inferior options, even alongside better 
alternatives, may be problematic. In addition, the menu of options offered 
may influence investors’ allocations, cause investors to select too many 
funds, or paralyze investors altogether. 
Finally, the limited attention our subjects paid to fund fees casts doubt 
on the claim, as reflected in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Jones,158 that 
market competition renders judicial oversight of fees unnecessary. The 
relative insensitivity of investors to economically important fee differences 
suggests a market failure—one that cannot readily be addressed by the 
SEC’s current focus on expanded disclosure.  
CONCLUSION 
Many studies have identified biases or mistakes in consumers’ real-world 
investment decisions. Regulatory changes that have increased individual 
responsibility for retirement savings and investment choices magnify the 
consequences of these mistakes. The extent to which disclosures, investor 
education, or other strategies can address these mistakes is a critical policy 
concern.  
We constructed an experiment designed to inform the process of regula-
tory design by developing a greater understanding of investor decisionmak-
ing behavior. The study has important implications for future regulatory 
policy. First, our results contribute evidence that investor choice, without 
more, does little to protect investors or to produce efficient investment 
 
Names and Marketing, Securities Act Release No. 9126, Exchange Act Release No. 62,300, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 29,301, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (proposed June 23, 2010) 
(proposing increased disclosure requirements in connection with the marketing of target-date 
funds). 
157 Pat Regnier, 3 Things to Know About Target-Date Funds, CNNMONEY ( July 31, 2012), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/31/retirement/target-date-fund-risks.moneymag/index.htm. 
158 See supra note 11. 
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decisions. Second, our study casts doubt on the claim that poor investor 
decisions are the result of lengthy or confusing disclosure documents and 
suggests that simplified disclosure, without more, is unlikely to affect 
investor behavior significantly. Third, our findings suggest a research agenda 
for improving investor literacy. 
The experimental manipulation in this study, although modest, signifi-
cantly affected both investor behavior and beliefs. Our results suggest that 
offering investor education, even in the form of a simple instruction, can 
make a substantial difference.  
